Imagine a scenario where a U.S. president, for example Donald Trump, declares that one troy ounce of gold is now worth $140,000 in U.S. dollars. This would be a staggering leap from the current market gold price (around $2,000–$3,000 in early 2025) and implies an enormous devaluation of the dollar. Such a move raises many questions about political feasibility, economic consequences, and historical precedent. This report examines whether a U.S. president has the power or tools to implement a drastic gold revaluation, under what conditions it might occur, and the potential impacts on the national debt, inflation, the dollar’s value, international trade, and the global monetary system. We also revisit the historical context of gold-backed currency (the gold standard) and past U.S. gold revaluations (notably by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933 and Richard Nixon in 1971). Throughout, we incorporate insights from economists, financial historians, and monetary policy analysts on the plausibility and implications of a $140,000/oz gold scenario.
Historical Context: Gold-Backed Currency and Past Revaluations
Gold Standard Era and Bretton Woods (Pre-1971)
For much of modern history until the 20th century, major currencies were linked to gold. The United States formally adopted a gold standard in the 19th century, which meant the dollar’s value was defined as a fixed amount of gold (around $20.67 per troy ounce by the early 1900s). This classical gold standard ensured that U.S. paper money was convertible into gold on demand, constraining the money supply and theoretically guarding against inflation (linkedin.com).
After World War II, the Bretton Woods system (1944–1971) reestablished gold as the anchor of the international monetary order: the U.S. dollar was pegged at $35 per ounce of gold, and other allied currencies were pegged to the dollar. This made the dollar the de facto world reserve currency, because foreign governments could convert dollars to gold at the fixed $35 rate. However, by the late 1960s this system came under strain – the U.S. had printed more money (for domestic programs and the Vietnam War) than its gold reserves could support at $35/oz, and other countries began doubting the dollar’s convertibility. In essence, there were far more dollars in circulation than could be redeemed by the U.S. gold stock, making the peg increasingly untenable (linkedin.com). This led to a monetary crisis as gold was being drained from U.S. reserves by other nations (notably France under de Gaulle). The stage was set for a major policy change.
FDR’s 1933 Gold Revaluation (Dollar Devaluation)
Decades earlier, during the Great Depression, President Franklin D. Roosevelt took drastic action regarding gold, and an episode often cited when discussing gold revaluation. In 1933, facing deflation and economic collapse, FDR took the U.S. off the gold standard domestically. By executive order, private ownership of monetary gold was outlawed and Americans were required to sell their gold to the U.S. Treasury (at the official price of $20.67/oz) (publish0x.com).
Soon after consolidating the government’s gold holdings, the administration reset the price of gold to $35 per ounce in January 1934 (via the Gold Reserve Act of 1934). This effectively devalued the dollar by about 40% – it now took $35 to get the same amount of gold that used to cost $20.67. This devaluation had the intended macroeconomic effect of raising price levels (ending persistent deflation) and reducing the real burden of debt by inflating incomes and prices (atlantafed.org). Historian accounts note that Roosevelt’s gold policy was controversial but consequential: it amounted to a partial default on the gold convertibility promise, leaving “dollar holders on the hook” while gold holders saw a 75% increase in value in dollar terms overnight (publish0x.com). With the dollar worth less in gold, anyone holding gold (including foreign governments) gained, and those holding dollars or dollar-denominated bonds lost in real terms. This bold revaluation created a windfall for the U.S. Treasury as well and by increasing the value of gold on the government’s balance sheet, the Treasury effectively gained extra resources without new taxes or borrowing. In fact, the gold revaluation in 1934 generated about $2 billion in incremental value for the government, which was used to fund an Exchange Stabilization Fund (publish0x.com). Roosevelt’s actions demonstrated that under extraordinary circumstances a U.S. president, backed by Congress, could significantly alter the gold value of the dollar.
Nixon’s 1971 “Nixon Shock” and End of Dollar Convertibility
By the late 1960s and 1970, the U.S. faced another predicament: under Bretton Woods, the official gold price remained $35/oz, but this was now far below gold’s market value needed to equilibrate supply and demand. Foreign central banks, suspicious of the dollar’s strength, began demanding gold for their dollar reserves. U.S. gold reserves plunged as a result. In August 1971, President Richard Nixon unilaterally ended the direct convertibility of the dollar to gold, in what’s known as the “Nixon Shock.” This meant foreign governments could no longer swap their dollars for U.S. gold while effectively suspending the gold standard internationally. While Nixon presented it as a temporary measure, it became permanent; by 1973 the Bretton Woods system had fully collapsed. The dollar was left to float in value against gold and other currencies. Gold’s price promptly shot up in market trading from $35 to ~$70 within months, and much higher in the years after. The U.S. officially adjusted the book value of its gold to $42.22/oz in 1972, but this was largely symbolic (publish0x.com).
The immediate “reset” in 1971–1973 was smaller in scale than Roosevelt’s 1934 move and about a 20% formal devaluation (from $35 to $42), but the free-market price of gold soon far exceeded those levels, reflecting a broad loss of confidence in the dollar. The 1970s subsequently saw high inflation in the dollar (peaking in 1979–1980) which, in effect, eroded the real value of debt similarly to how Roosevelt’s devaluation had done decades earlier. By ending the gold peg, the U.S. freed itself to print money as needed (fiat currency), but at the cost of stability. The adjustment period involved significant global financial turmoil and the end of the postwar monetary order. This history shows that U.S. leaders have indeed redefined the dollar’s relation to gold in the past, but only amidst serious economic strains.
Historical Lessons: Both 1933 and 1971 demonstrate that gold revaluation has been used as a tool in extreme conditions: to combat deflation and depression in FDR’s case, and to avert a reserve crisis and trade imbalances in Nixon’s case. However, both cases also had major repercussions: Roosevelt’s move shocked savers and was seen by some as a de facto debt default, and Nixon’s move ushered in a decade of inflation and volatility as the world adjusted to a fiat dollar. These episodes underline that altering gold’s price is a drastic measure, not taken lightly, and it fundamentally alters economic relationships. With this context in mind, we turn to the present-day feasibility of a president resetting gold to an astronomical $140,000 per ounce.
Can a U.S. President Set the Price of Gold Today?
Legally and practically, the ability of a U.S. president to unilaterally set a new gold price is much more constrained today than it was in the gold-standard era. During the 1930s, laws like the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 explicitly authorized the president to change the gold value of the dollar by proclamation (federalreservehistory.org).
Indeed, FDR used that authority to promulgate the $35/oz rate. Similarly, under Bretton Woods the executive branch had some discretion (in concert with international agreements) to adjust the peg (e.g. the modest change to $42.22 in 1972). After 1971, however, the U.S. dollar ceased to be defined in terms of gold, so there is currently no official gold price for the dollar to adjust. Gold trades freely on global commodity markets, and its price in dollars is determined by supply and demand.
For a president to “set” the price of gold now, the policy framework of the country would have to shift back to a gold-reference of some kind. In practical terms, a president cannot simply decree that private markets must transact gold at $140,000/oz. What the president could attempt is to create a pegging mechanism. For example, ordering the U.S. Treasury or Federal Reserve to buy or sell gold at $140,000 per ounce, thereby establishing a price floor. In the hypothetical scenario, President Trump could announce that the Treasury “will buy any gold offered for sale at $140,000 per ounce” (goldbroker.com).
This echoes how a gold standard peg works: the government stands ready to exchange currency for gold (and vice versa) at the fixed rate. If credible, such a commitment would eventually make $140,000 the market price, since no rational seller would accept less than the government’s standing offer. Essentially, this would be a massive devaluation of the dollar and the dollar’s value in terms of gold would drop by a factor of 70 (since $140k vs ~$2k current price is about 70 times higher).
Does the president have the authority to do this? It’s debatable. The Federal Reserve is independent and controls U.S. monetary policy; a president cannot simply order the Fed to fix gold convertibility without potential legislation or Fed cooperation. During crises however, extraordinary measures might be taken. For instance, some analysts point out that there are existing legal provisions that could facilitate a gold revaluation windfall: under certain accounting rules, if the Treasury declared a new gold value, the Fed could credit that difference to the Treasury General Account as a form of liquidity (vongreyerz.gold).
In fact, the Treasury is legally allowed to pledge its gold to the Fed for cash. A revaluation from the current book value ($42.22) to market price or higher could dramatically increase the cash the Fed can extend (gata.org). This idea was floated in recent debt-ceiling debates as a way to create funding without technically borrowing. Still, going all the way to $140,000/oz would go far beyond a bookkeeping adjustment; it would represent a new monetary system. To implement a true gold peg or gold standard restoration, it’s likely Congress would need to be involved, perhaps reinstating a definition of the dollar in terms of gold. It might also involve renegotiating international monetary relations, as other countries would be affected.
Political constraints are significant. Ever since the 1980s, mainstream U.S. economic policy has rejected the idea of returning to a gold standard. A former Trump Fed nominee Judy Shelton, who advocated a modern gold standard, drew intense criticism for being “out of step” with conventional economic thought (vox.com).
Even Fed Chairman Jerome Powell remarked in 2019 that he did not support a gold standard, noting that it would tie the Fed’s hands on money supply and interest rates, or in other words, policy would be subordinated to maintaining the gold peg, potentially at the cost of high unemployment or other goals. Powell quipped that implementing a gold standard would mean requiring interest rates to be whatever is needed to maintain gold parity, which could be very destabilizing (linkedin.com). In short, a president attempting to reset gold’s price would face institutional pushback from the Federal Reserve and likely lack a legal framework unless a national emergency was used to justify it. One precedent is that in 1933, FDR invoked emergency authority to seize gold, and Congress retroactively authorized changes in dollar policy. Perhaps in a severe future crisis (say a currency collapse or debt emergency), a president might similarly claim extraordinary powers to redefine the dollar. Absent extreme conditions, however, the political feasibility is low and it would be a radical departure from the fiat money system that has been in place for over 50 years.
Political Feasibility and Conditions Required
For Trump or any president to set gold at $140,000, the political environment would have to be extraordinary. One can envision specific conditions under which such a dramatic move might be considered:
- Severe Debt or Currency Crisis: If U.S. debt levels become unsustainable (e.g. a risk of default or a loss of confidence in U.S. Treasuries) or if the dollar is in free-fall in forex markets, radical measures might gain traction. Advocates of gold revaluation note that U.S. debt has ballooned and see a gold reset as a way to restore solvency. In early 2025, the U.S. national debt stands around $36–37 trillion (over 120% of GDP) (reuters.com), and some argue this is unsustainable. If normal fiscal or monetary measures fail, a government might attempt a debt jubilee via inflation, effectively printing money to eliminate debt, which is what a gold revaluation would accomplish since it devalues the currency. Historical analogies include post-war periods or hyperinflations where a new currency or new parity is established after wiping out the old obligations.
- Global Monetary Reset (International Agreement): Another scenario is a coordinated international revaluation. If major economies collectively decided to anchor currencies to gold at new exchange rates (perhaps as part of a Bretton Woods-style conference to address global debt), then a $140,000 price might emerge as part of a negotiated outcome. This is speculative, but not entirely unheard of. After World War II, global leaders met to redesign the monetary system; some economists today suggest a new commodity-backed system could be proposed if fiat currencies continue to destabilize. However, the U.S. would likely resist any move that undermines its monetary hegemony. In the 1970s, U.S. officials, like Henry Kissinger, were terrified of a global gold revaluation plan that would force the dollar back on gold and level the playing field. Kissinger knew that “if the USA shows its hand and starts revaluing gold to pay down debt… this would mean the end of American supremacy” because “he who has the most gold wins” in such a system (vongreyerz.gold). The U.S. currently holds the largest official gold reserves (8,133 tonnes), but other nations collectively have more, and a reset could diminish the unique privilege of the U.S. dollar. Thus, politically, U.S. leaders have been more inclined to suppress gold’s monetary role than to enhance it, absent a dire need.
- Populist or Authoritarian Political Shift: Short of full crisis, a fiercely populist administration with a strong mandate might try unorthodox financial engineering. Donald Trump has in the past mused about unconventional debt strategies. Markets recall that as a candidate in 2016, Trump suggested the U.S. could “negotiate discounts” on its debt or print money to avoid default, which was startling to orthodox economists. In a second term, if Trump surrounded himself with advisors favoring hard money or creative debt solutions, a gold revaluation could surface as a policy tool. Notably, some of Trump’s advisers in 2025 have floated unusual ideas: forcing foreign creditors to accept lower interest payments, selling expensive “golden visa” immigration cards, or monetizing assets like federal land or gold (reuters.com). While none of these ideas alone solve the debt problem, they show a willingness to “think outside the box”. A gold revaluation would be the most extreme of such ideas. If political checks and balances weakened (for instance, an empowered executive with a compliant Congress or emergency powers), it’s conceivable the president could institute something like a gold peg at a high price. However, it’s worth noting that multiple economists told Reuters that these outside-the-box ideas (including leveraging gold) are unlikely to truly fix U.S. finances and could instead “undermine U.S. creditworthiness and upset the global financial system” (reuters.com). In other words, there would be strong opposition from the financial establishment, fearing chaos.
In summary, politically this is highly infeasible under normal conditions. It would require either a massive crisis that normal policy cannot fix (making a gold reset politically palatable as a last resort) or a very strong-willed leadership willing to break with orthodox policy and possibly impose controls. The Federal Reserve and most of Congress would likely be opposed due to the risks. Even within a Trump administration, key figures (e.g. Treasury officials like Secretary Scott Bessent in 2025) have downplayed the notion of gold revaluation, preferring more modest asset monetization ideas (reuters.com). Unless faced with an existential economic emergency, a move to $140,000 gold would be politically revolutionary.
Economic Feasibility: Impacts of a $140,000/oz Gold Price
Suppose, for the sake of analysis, that the U.S. did announce a new gold price of $140,000 per ounce. What would the economic effects be? This section evaluates how such a revaluation might affect the national debt, inflation and the dollar, international trade, and the global monetary system. We also consider whether it would truly mean a return to a gold-backed dollar and what that entails in terms of gold reserves and credibility.
Effect on U.S. National Debt and Government Finances
One motivation for advocates of drastic gold revaluation is to address the U.S. national debt. The logic is straightforward: if the U.S. values its gold reserves high enough, their dollar value could match (or exceed) the outstanding debt, essentially “backing” the debt with gold or creating resources to pay it off. The United States officially holds about 8,133 metric tons of gold in reserves, which is roughly 261 million troy ounces of gold (linkedin.com).
At today’s market price (~$2,000/oz), this hoard is worth only about $0.5 trillion – just a small fraction (~1–2%) of the $30+ trillion federal debt. But at $140,000/oz, the same gold would be worth an astronomical $36.5 trillion, essentially equal to the current U.S. debt (publish0x.com). In other words, a $140k gold price could, on paper, cover 100% of the federal debt (see Table 1).
Table 1: U.S. Gold Reserve Value at Various Gold Prices (Comparing to ~$36.5 Trillion Debt)
| Gold Price (USD/oz) | Value of U.S. Gold Reserves (8,133 tonnes) | % of ~$36.5T Debt Covered |
| $2,000 | ~$0.52 trillion | ~1% |
| $5,000 | ~$1.31 trillion | ~4% |
| $10,000 | ~$2.61 trillion | ~7% |
| $20,000 | ~$5.23 trillion | ~14% |
| $50,000 | ~$13.07 trillion | ~36% |
| $100,000 | ~$26.15 trillion | ~72% |
| $140,000 | ~$36.61 trillion | ~100% |
Sources: U.S. official gold holdings ~261 million oz (linkedin.com); debt figures from U.S. Treasury (${36.5T}$ as of 2025). Calculations by the author.
As the table shows, only at extremely high gold prices does the gold stock’s value approach the scale of U.S. debt. Around $120,000–$140,000 per ounce is what’s needed to “cancel” the debt in one swoop, given a ~$36T debt load (publish0x.com).
In fact, an analysis in early 2025 noted that with federal debt at $36.5 trillion, gold would need to be about $140,000/oz to wipe it out – up from an estimate of ~$120,000 when the debt was around $31T in 2022 (publish0x.com). This specific number highlights how rapidly U.S. debt has grown and how high gold would have to go to keep up.
But how would this debt cancellation or reduction actually work? There are a few theoretical mechanisms:
- Direct payoff with revalued gold: The government could sell some of its gold at $140k/oz and use the proceeds to retire debt. However, who would buy gold at that price, except the government itself? In practice, the Fed (or Treasury) would likely be the ones “buying” at $140k, effectively printing money to do so (because no private actor would pay such a price unless they believed the dollar’s value was truly that low now). This bleeds into the second mechanism below.
- Monetizing via the Federal Reserve: If the Treasury simply declares its gold is now worth $36T instead of $0.5T, the Federal Reserve could credit the Treasury’s account with the difference (roughly $36T new dollars) in a process akin to money creation. This is what is meant by the idea that “every $4,000 increase in gold’s price gives the Treasury $1 trillion free and clear” (jpost.com). Monetary analysts like Jim Rickards point out that, arithmetically, each $4,000 rise per ounce adds about $1 trillion in value to the U.S. gold stock (discoveryalert.com.au). Scaling that up, a jump of ~$138,000/oz (from ~$2k to $140k) would add on the order of $34–$35 trillion and essentially enough to cover liabilities. In effect, the Treasury’s balance sheet would be transformed: an asset (gold) now carries huge value, which can be leveraged to print new dollars without “borrowing.” This is sometimes framed as the government owing the debt to itself now, neutralized by the valuable asset it holds. In accounting terms, it could eliminate the net debt.
- Offer bondholders gold at the new rate: An alternative approach could be to redeem U.S. Treasury bonds in gold. For example, the government might say to creditors: “Instead of paying you back in dollars, we will pay you in gold (or in dollars that are now gold-backed at $140k).” If creditors accepted this, it would retire debts with gold. However, since the dollar was just massively devalued, this is equivalent to paying them far less in real terms. It’s effectively a partial default or haircut, disguised as a generous offer of gold at a high price. In practice, foreign creditors might not find this appealing unless they too value gold that highly – more likely they would see it as getting repaid in greatly depreciated currency. Historically, something akin to this happened domestically in 1933: U.S. government bonds had clauses payable in gold or gold value, and the Roosevelt administration abrogated those gold clauses, meaning creditors could not demand payment in gold after devaluation. Courts upheld this move, cementing that creditors had to accept devalued dollars (this “reframing” of debt saved the government from a much higher debt load in gold terms) (atlantafed.org).
In all scenarios, the bottom line is that revaluing gold to such a degree amounts to inflating away the debt. The U.S. would essentially be creating dollars (or dollar value) out of thin air by fiat pricing of gold, and using those dollars to wipe out obligations. Nominally, the debt could be eliminated or reduced, but this does not mean the country is magically richer – it means the currency is worth proportionally less. Bondholders and dollar holders would bear the cost. Economist Jennifer Warren analogized such proposals to “the government printing money to pay itself,” warning that it’s really just a form of default via devaluation, which could severely damage U.S. credit in the long run (reuters.com).
It’s worth noting that the U.S. government already plays a minor accounting game with gold’s value: by law, it still carries gold on its books at the outdated price of $42.22/oz (set in 1973) (reuters.com).
This is why the Fed balance sheet lists only ~$11 billion worth of gold assets, far below market value (reuters.com). If they simply updated the book value to the current market (say $3,000/oz), it would create a one-time windfall (around $750–800 billion) credited to Treasury (publish0x.com). In fact, such a move was suggested as a way to get around the debt ceiling in 2023–2024: revalue gold modestly, and use that equity to borrow more before hitting the limit (gata.org). However, mainstream policymakers have not seriously considered even this small step, let alone a leap to $140k. They fear it would undermine confidence, set a precedent of monetary manipulation, and only postpone fiscal issues. One former Fed official called the idea of big gold revaluation “tempting” but warned it would have “far-reaching implications for the financial system”, complicating the Fed’s operations and potentially spooking markets (gata.org).
In summary, a $140,000 gold price could theoretically eliminate the national debt in nominal terms by leveraging the value of U.S. gold reserves. It would turn the government’s debt problem into a currency value problem – effectively solving debt by debasing the dollar. As we’ll see next, that cure is arguably worse than the disease, as it would bring explosive inflation and loss of credibility. But from a pure accounting perspective, yes, revaluing gold that high “zeroes out” U.S. debt (in dollar terms) (jpost.com). This is why gold revaluation is sometimes described as the ultimate reset button or “nuclear option” for a debt-laden government.
Inflation and the U.S. Dollar
Resetting gold to $140,000/oz would have a profound effect on the value of the dollar – essentially signaling a 97–98% devaluation of the currency relative to a hard benchmark. Such a move would be highly inflationary for the domestic economy, likely to the point of hyperinflation if done overnight. Even proponents of a gold revaluation acknowledge this. Precious metals expert Andy Schectman, who argues in favor of a $142,000 gold price to address debt, admits bluntly: “It would create hyperinflation quickly” (jpost.com). Why? Because if gold, a universal reference of value, is suddenly priced astronomically higher in dollars, it means the dollar is correspondingly worth that much less. Prices of other commodities, imports, and eventually wages would adjust upwards violently to reflect the new reality that the dollar has been deeply devalued.
For perspective, raising gold from $2,000 to $140,000 is a 70-fold increase (7,000% rise). If the general price level followed suit, what used to cost $1 would cost $70. Of course, it’s not one-to-one; gold’s revaluation might overshoot the general price inflation. But at the very least, one would expect a massive surge in commodity prices and consumer prices as the currency’s value is marked down. Historical analogies might include Weimar Germany in 1923 or Zimbabwe in the 2000s, where currency resets involving setting a new value for gold (or introducing gold-convertible notes) only occurred after the hyperinflation had effectively destroyed the old currency’s value. In those cases, a gold peg was used to restore trust after the value was lost, but it didn’t prevent the pain of inflation; it simply drew a line under it.
In the case of a deliberate U.S. gold revaluation, the government would be intentionally triggering massive inflation as a policy tool to wipe out debt. The immediate impact would be that anyone holding dollars or dollar-denominated assets (like bonds or bank savings) would see their real value plummet. It’s effectively a wealth transfer from creditors to debtors (the government being the biggest debtor). Real assets like property, stocks, and precious metals would likely surge in nominal price as people flee the debasing dollar. Confidence in the dollar could evaporate internationally – after all, if the U.S. just devalued by 98% in a stroke, why would anyone trust it not to do more?
One possible mitigating factor is that if the government simultaneously announces that after revaluation, the dollar will once again be backed by gold at $140,000/oz, it may eventually anchor expectations and stop the inflation at a new equilibrium. In theory, if people believe the new peg will hold, then once prices have adjusted to the roughly 1/140000th gold content, inflation could stabilize. This was essentially how it worked in 1934: once the dollar was defined as 1/35th of an ounce of gold (instead of 1/20.67th), the price level rose accordingly and then stabilized around the new anchor. Likewise, after the hyperinflation in Weimar Germany, a new currency (the Rentenmark, then Reichsmark) was introduced with a peg to gold or land values, which helped restore stability, but only after wiping out the previous savings.
However, the credibility of a new $140,000 gold peg would be suspect. Unlike 1934, when the U.S. still had a reputation for sound finance (and even then it was a shock), today such a move could be seen as a sign of desperation. If not carefully managed, it could spiral into a loss of faith in money itself, with people possibly rejecting the dollar in favor of other currencies or tangible assets. Foreign exchange markets would likely punish the dollar severely. We could see the dollar’s exchange rate against other major currencies fall proportionally (though if those other currencies don’t revalue their gold, they might rise sharply against the dollar until those countries decide how to respond – more on that in the global section).
In summary, inflation would explode with a $140k gold decree. The U.S. would in effect be choosing inflation as a way out of debt. This would shrink the real debt and reframe it in new terms, and perhaps re-denominating it in “new dollars” linked to gold. But everyday Americans would feel the pain through soaring prices. It’s hard to imagine this happening in any controlled way and it’s essentially the government sacrificing the value of the currency to achieve a debt reset. This is why most economists consider such an approach extremely risky and harmful. It’s “solving” the debt by destroying the dollar – akin to burning your house down to get rid of the termites. Any analysis must conclude that hyper-inflating the currency would have grave economic and social consequences, potentially worse than the debt problem itself.
Impact on the U.S. Dollar’s Global Role
The U.S. dollar is currently the world’s primary reserve currency and a status built on decades of (relative) stability, deep financial markets, and trust in U.S. institutions. A unilateral, extreme gold revaluation would be an unprecedented jolt to that status. How might it affect the dollar’s standing internationally?
- Loss of Reserve Currency Confidence: Other countries hold trillions of dollars in reserves (as Treasury bonds, etc.). If those dollars are suddenly devalued 98%, foreign creditors would be incensed. It would be seen as a huge default on external obligations. China, Japan, and other major holders of U.S. debt would suffer enormous losses in real value. This could accelerate moves they are already making to diversify reserves (e.g. into gold, euros, or yuan). The dollar’s reputation could be permanently damaged, leading central banks worldwide to sharply reduce their reliance on dollars. The U.S., by essentially repudiating its debt via devaluation, might also lose its AA/AAA credit rating (if it hadn’t already in the lead-up). The global financial system, which prices many commodities and contracts in USD, would be thrown into chaos as participants scramble to adjust to the new dollar value.
- Possible Strength from Gold Backing (Long-Term): There is a counterintuitive argument: if the U.S. truly puts the dollar back on gold at $140k, after the initial shock, the dollar might eventually gain some stability because it is once again anchored. Some gold standard advocates claim that re-basing the currency could restore confidence in the long run (since dollars would be as good as gold again). However, this depends entirely on the credibility of the commitment. Given the extreme nature of the devaluation, many might doubt that the peg will hold (would the U.S. devalue again in a few years if debt builds up again?). Remember, part of reserve currency appeal is predictability and rule of law – suddenly changing the rules undermines that. It took generations for the dollar to earn trust; it could lose it overnight. Even if the dollar is now gold-backed, some countries might prefer to hold gold itself rather than dollars, since the U.S. demonstrated a willingness to drastically alter the deal. In effect, a $140k revaluation might end the “faith-based” fiat dollar era, replacing it with a pegged dollar that has to re-earn trust like a new currency.
- Reactions of Other Currencies: Other major currencies (euro, yen, yuan, pound, etc.) would have to decide whether to follow the U.S. devaluation or not. If the U.S. alone devalues, the dollar would crash relative to others. That would make U.S. exports hyper-competitive (more on trade next), but it would also export inflation to countries that import from the U.S. or price commodities in dollars. Foreign nations might respond by also devaluing or revaluing gold in their own currency to keep parity. In the 1930s, when one country devalued, others often retaliated to maintain trade competitiveness (the “beggar thy neighbor” devaluations). In a modern context, perhaps other countries would say: “We are also raising our official gold price.” If all did proportionally, it could be akin to a global inflation – effectively a coordinated reduction in paper currency values relative to gold. This might be the start of a new global monetary order, where all currencies are re-pegged at new rates. Alternatively, other countries might refuse to play along, letting their currencies skyrocket against the dollar; but that would hurt their exporters badly, so there would be pressure on them to adjust somehow.
Overall, the U.S. dollar’s dominance would likely diminish. We could see a more multipolar reserve system emerge. Perhaps gold itself would regain a significant role as a neutral reserve asset (central banks already have been buying gold at record levels recently (jpost.com), partly as a hedge against dollar weakness). The dollar might still exist, but if its value is tied to gold at a high price, then effectively gold would reclaim the throne as the ultimate measure of value, displacing some of the dollar’s unique privilege. This is precisely what U.S. strategists feared in the 1970s: that a move back to gold would “make the US just one more economically average nation among many, not the singular superpower” (vongreyerz.gold). In the long run, the dollar could stabilize at the new gold-backed parity, but its usage might be more limited, sharing space with other currencies or gold itself in international trade.
International Trade Implications
If the dollar is massively devalued and possibly pegged to gold at the new rate, the relative prices of imports and exports change drastically:
- U.S. Exports Boom (Competitiveness): A weaker dollar makes American goods and services far cheaper for the rest of the world. In theory, U.S. exporters would find their products in hot demand globally, potentially creating an export boom. This could help U.S. manufacturing and could shrink the trade deficit. In fact, one of the points noted by advocates of devaluation is that it would “enhance global export competitiveness” of the U.S. (discoveryalert.com.au). However, this assumes the global trading system is still functioning in dollars, but if trust in the dollar evaporates, foreign buyers might be reluctant to accept dollar pricing despite the cheapness, unless the new gold peg is credible.
- U.S. Imports Crash / Domestic Prices Surge: The flip side is that imports become astronomically expensive in dollar terms. America relies on many imported goods such as electronics, apparel, and many raw materials. Following a dollar devaluation, import prices would shoot up, feeding directly into domestic inflation. This could cause shortages or a standard of living drop until wages adjust. The U.S. might have to rapidly substitute away from imports or produce more at home, which can’t happen overnight for all goods. In an extreme scenario, trade contracts might be broken or renegotiated to account for the currency upheaval. The U.S. might even impose price controls or rationing for essential imports like energy if the price spike is too severe however this is speculative, but within the realm of how governments respond to hyperinflation (for example, in the 1970s inflation, the U.S. tried wage and price controls in 1971, and Nixon’s shock was partly to deal with a trade imbalance and inflation pressures).
- Trade Partners’ Response: Countries that export to the U.S. (e.g. China, EU, Mexico) would find their goods suddenly very expensive in the U.S. market, which could collapse demand. Their industries could suffer unless they also devalue their currencies. This creates huge pressure for competitive devaluations. Alternatively, if the U.S. has now pegged to gold, those countries might choose to also peg their currencies to gold at new rates to restore stability in exchange rates. For instance, China could announce a gold backing for the yuan at a rate consistent with $140k gold in USD (which might be a huge yuan devaluation as well). However, some countries might resist and instead move away from using dollars for trade, to avoid the volatility. We could see more trade being invoiced in other currencies or gold directly.
- Global Monetary System Reset: The shock of a U.S. gold revaluation might force an international conference (like a new Plaza Accord or Bretton Woods) to realign currencies. If the U.S. acted unilaterally, eventually there would have to be negotiations to normalize trade and capital flows post-devaluation. Possibly a new global monetary regime could emerge, e.g., a return to a form of gold standard internationally. It might involve the U.S. and other major economies agreeing to convert their currencies to gold at new ratios. In that scenario, gold becomes the intermediary for trade (like pre-1971). This could bring longer-term stability once new parities are set, but the transition would be tumultuous.
- Debts and Contracts in Dollars: Another trade-related aspect is that many international loans, contracts, and commodities are denominated in dollars. A 98% devaluation would upend countless contracts. For example, if an emerging market country owes $100 million in dollar bonds, after devaluation the real value of what they owe drops dramatically in gold or other currency terms – effectively a windfall for them (and a loss for the creditor). Many such debts might be paid off easily, but creditors (often Western investors) would be outraged. We could see a wave of legal disputes and defaults as parties try to adjust or refuse the new terms. Similarly, commodity contracts (say an oil contract priced in USD) would see wild price readjustments.
In essence, international trade would face a period of chaos. Eventually, if the dust settles with a new gold-linked system, trade can resume with new exchange rates. But the interim dislocation could lead to recessions in countries hit by the sudden change in trade terms. The U.S. might enjoy a brief export-driven recovery due to the cheap dollar, but that could be overshadowed by internal hyperinflation and external financial turmoil.
Could the Dollar Be Backed by Gold Again? (Reserves and Credibility Requirements)
A key part of the scenario is the notion of returning the dollar to a gold-backed currency. If Trump or another leader revalues gold and intends to “restore” a gold standard, what would it take to make that credible and sustainable?
Gold Reserve Adequacy: One immediate question: Does the U.S. have enough gold to back its money supply at $140,000/oz? At that price, as noted, the gold would equal the current debt. But what about the money in circulation (the monetary base or broader money like M2)? U.S. M2 money supply is on the order of $20 trillion (linkedin.com).
With 261 million ounces of gold, if each ounce is $140k, that’s $36.5T of value and actually enough to cover even M2 (which is interesting; it suggests $140k/oz could in theory back not just the debt but all dollars in circulation with 100% reserve). In practice, a traditional gold standard does not require 100% backing of all money but historically, a fractional gold cover was enough (for example, the Federal Reserve before 1933 had to hold gold equal to 40% of its notes). If the U.S. only aimed for 40% backing of the money supply, a much lower gold price would suffice. However, current gold reserves at market value (~$0.5T) are only a few percent of the money supply (linkedin.com). That’s why any realistic return to gold would need either a vastly higher gold price or a much smaller money supply. The former is what we’re discussing (raise price to increase gold’s dollar value); the latter would mean draconian monetary tightening (which would be extremely deflationary and likely unacceptable). So, raising the price is the chosen path in this scenario.
At $140k, 100% backing is achieved for current money. If money supply grows, either more gold is needed or periodic revaluations would be needed (which undermines credibility). To maintain a gold standard, the U.S. would have to control money issuance such that it doesn’t outpace the available gold backing in the long run. This implies a lot of discipline: something modern governments have struggled with.
Convertibility and Trust: A gold-backed dollar only has meaning if holders of dollars can actually exchange them for gold at the fixed rate (at least certain holders, like foreign central banks or perhaps even the public). Will the U.S. allow redemption of dollars for gold at $140k/oz? If yes, it must be prepared to part with gold if someone presents dollars. That could be a problem if people doubt the system and there could be a “run” on the Treasury’s gold where everyone tries to swap their presumably devalued dollars for the shiny metal. The U.S. might have to impose limits (as in Bretton Woods, only foreign governments could redeem, not individuals). To be credible, though, someone has to be able to get gold for dollars so that the parity isn’t just fictional. If the U.S. reneges on convertibility, then it’s not a true gold standard, just an arbitrary price peg.
Establishing credibility would likely require international cooperation or oversight. In past gold-standard regimes, international balances were settled in gold, and there was a kind of discipline because if a country printed too much, it lost gold to others. In a new system, the U.S. might need to show good faith by possibly allowing some audit or verification of its gold and by sticking to rules (for example, not changing the gold price every time it’s convenient). Critics note that the U.S. could be tempted to repeat history by promising gold convertibility and then suspending it when it becomes inconvenient (as Nixon did). So credibility is a huge issue. It might take a treaty or constitutional change to convince people that the gold backing is real and lasting. Some have proposed, for instance, issuing gold-backed Treasury bonds or a new gold-linked digital currency as a signal of commitment.
Global Gold Distribution: If the world returns to a gold-based system, countries with large gold reserves (like the U.S., Eurozone, Russia, China) would have an edge in supporting their currencies. The U.S. currently claims the largest official gold reserve. If that gold is honestly accounted for and still in Fort Knox (Trump’s advisers even suggested auditing the vaults to ensure “the gold has not been stolen” (reuters.com), the U.S. could say it has the wherewithal to back the dollar. However, some analysts worry the U.S. might not have as much as claimed or that much is pledged, however these are speculative concerns often raised by gold conspiracy theorists. Assuming the 8,133 tons are there, the U.S. has a decent foundation. But other nations have been increasing their gold and central banks globally have been buying at a “level the world has never seen” recently (jpost.com). This suggests others are preparing for a possible shift in the monetary regime. If the U.S. moves first to revalue gold, those nations benefit too (their gold becomes worth more in their own currency terms, if they also devalue accordingly). It could usher in a more multipolar gold-based system rather than a strictly U.S.-centric one.
Mainstream Economic Skepticism: Most modern economists argue that returning to a gold standard would be impractical and potentially harmful. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis noted that the U.S. money supply far exceeds the available gold – by orders of magnitude – making a traditional gold standard infeasible at current prices (linkedin.com).
They also highlight that a gold standard would remove the Fed’s ability to respond to recessions by adjusting interest rates or printing money, which could lead to deeper economic downturns (linkedin.com). In other words, the economy might become more unstable in output and employment because the money supply can’t easily expand in a crisis (this was indeed a problem during some gold standard periods, like the 1930s until abandonment). For gold backing to work without causing deflation, the initial price of gold needs to be high enough (hence the $140k idea) and perhaps allowed to adjust periodically, but if it adjusts, then it’s not a strict standard, it’s discretionary, which defeats the purpose. This paradox is why many say a credible gold standard now would either mean living with possibly violent swings in the economy or frequently changing the peg (which undermines credibility).
In practice, a compromise could be a partial gold backing or a gold-linked instrument. For example, the Treasury could issue gold-backed bonds or a digital token redeemable in gold, to introduce a form of discipline without fully replacing the fiat dollar. Some in Congress have even toyed with ideas like a new government cryptocurrency tied to gold. These ideas require trust as well, but might be more politically palatable than a full $140k re-pegging.
In conclusion, using gold to back the dollar again is theoretically possible but would require: a sufficiently high gold price (to cover money supply or a chosen fraction of it), rigorous commitment mechanisms, likely a supportive international framework, and a willingness to sacrifice the flexibility of fiat policy. A $140,000/oz price implies the U.S. chooses to back its entire debt and much of its money with gold; this would be a truly radical reset. The credibility of that would hinge on consistent policy thereafter. Past instances (1933, 1971) show the U.S. ultimately chose growth and flexibility over maintaining gold pegs when those pegs became inconvenient. So skeptics doubt a new gold standard would last in the long run unless there were sweeping political changes to entrench it.
Expert Perspectives and Commentary
The scenario of gold at $140,000/oz has been discussed by various analysts, ranging from gold enthusiasts to mainstream economists. Their perspectives provide insight into the feasibility and consequences:
- Proponents (Hard Money Advocates): Some gold industry figures and hard-money advocates actively discuss dramatic gold revaluation as a solution to excessive debt. Andy Schectman, a precious metals dealer and commentator, argues that a revaluation to around $140k could “offset 100% of [the] liabilities on the U.S. balance sheet”, giving the government financial breathing room (jpost.com). He points to historical precedents like Roosevelt’s 1933 devaluation and notes that it’s not without precedent to radically reset gold’s price. Schectman believes this would “eradicate debt across the whole spectrum” and allow a new system to rise, though he concedes it would unleash hyperinflation in the process (jpost.com). Another advocate, monetary analyst Jim Rickards, has long predicted that in a global monetary reset, gold could be revalued by governments to perhaps $10,000 or higher. He quantifies that roughly each $4,000 rise in gold adds $1 trillion in value to U.S. gold holdings, implying policymakers could choose a target price to cover a desired portion of debt (discoveryalert.com.au). These proponents often argue that since central banks are buying gold and institutions (like BIS) have reclassified gold as a top-tier reserve asset, the stage is being set for gold to play a larger monetary role (discoveryalert.com.au). In their view, while extreme, a gold reset is inevitable or logical given the scale of fiat debt, and it would ultimately restore discipline (after an initial shock). They also sometimes recommend measures like taxing gold windfalls or issuing gold bonds to smooth the process (goldbroker.com).
- Skeptics and Mainstream Economists: The majority of economists and financial historians view a forced gold revaluation with skepticism or alarm. They note that gold standard ideas are far outside mainstream policy, in fact, a former Trump economic advisor’s push for gold backing was considered so unorthodox that it likely blocked her Fed appointment (politico.com). Economists argue that there “isn’t enough gold to back the US dollar” at current values and that trying to do so would require prohibitively high gold prices or a huge contraction of the money supply (linkedin.com). They remind us that the U.S. (and the world) moved off gold precisely because of its limitations. Barry Eichengreen, a renowned economic historian, has written that attempts to return to gold in modern times are misguided nostalgia – the interwar gold standard contributed to the Great Depression by forcing deflationary adjustments, and abandoning gold was crucial to recovery. Ben Bernanke, former Fed Chairman, famously quipped that the idea of a gold standard is like returning to the telegram in the age of smartphones, it’s anachronistic. In practical terms, mainstream experts warn that a $140k gold price decree would be tantamount to monetary collapse. It would “undermine the value of the U.S. dollar” in a catastrophic way (discoveryalert.com.au) and likely destabilize the entire global financial system, which is built on fiat currency interactions. They also note that debts and deficits are real economic issues that can’t be simply wished away by repricing assets and ultimately, the productivity of the economy and fiscal policy (spending/revenues) determine solvency. Revaluing gold might buy time or liquidity, but without fiscal reform it’s just a one-off fix. Even analysts who entertain the thought as a theoretical exercise (like Lou Crandall of Wrightson ICAP) caution that it would be “messy” and interfere with the Fed’s operations, possibly forcing the Fed to stop shrinking its balance sheet and flood the system with liquidity (gata.org). Essentially, it’s seen as a desperate move. As one financial analyst summarized, if you think debt is unsustainable, outright inflation or default are the only ways out, and a massive gold revaluation is just default in another clothing.
- Financial Historians and Precedents: Historians put such a scenario in context. They compare it to the end of Bretton Woods or the 1930s currency devaluations. Many note that in 1971, Nixon faced a similar dynamic on a smaller scale when liabilities exceeded gold at the $35 price, and the result was abandoning the peg and letting gold price rise. However, that was done from a position of relative strength (the U.S. still dominated the global economy at that time) and in coordination with allies (Smithsonian Agreement, etc.), and even then it caused a decade of turbulence. A jump to $140k would be a far larger relative change. Some historians might reference France’s insistence in the late 1960s (de Gaulle sending a warship to collect gold) as a move that anticipated a reset. In that case, the U.S. chose to close the gold window rather than devalue to a higher gold price. If we consider why Nixon didn’t simply raise the price (say to $100/oz) and continue a gold standard at a new level, part of the reason was lack of international consensus and fear of speculators; once the genie was out of the bottle, they opted to float. A modern historian might thus conclude that any president trying to impose a gold price (especially unilaterally) would run into similar problems and it may not stick because markets can overwhelm pegs if not credible. They also note that no major economy has tried a gold peg in decades, and smaller ones that tried pegs to commodities or other currencies often ended in collapse (e.g. Argentina’s dollar peg in the 1990s). That said, some historians entertain the idea of a future gold-centric system given cycles of history that the world has alternated between commodity standards and fiat before. If debt crises become severe, they acknowledge a global “reset” could happen, possibly involving gold (along with digital currencies or SDRs). But they emphasize it would likely be coordinated and not just one president’s decree.
- Market Analysts and Investors: From a market perspective, even rumors of gold revaluation cause a stir. In late 2024 and early 2025, as gold prices climbed to all-time highs (crossing $2,500 and nearing $3,000), there was chatter in the financial community about the possibility of a U.S. gold revaluation (publish0x.com).Some traders speculated that the Treasury might use its gold to improve its balance sheet. TD Securities, an investment bank, noted the huge gap between the market value of U.S. gold (~$758B at the time) and its book value ($11B) and floated it in a note (reuters.com). This led to market speculation, though officials downplayed it. Investors generally view talk of $140k gold as far-fetched “fantasy” or extreme tail-risk scenario, but its emergence reflects underlying concerns: high debt, rising inflation, and declining trust in central banks. Gold prices rising can themselves be seen as the market voting that some kind of currency debasement is likely. Gold’s rally to ~$3,000 in 2025 was attributed in part to such fears. So, in an ironic way, even if a formal revaluation doesn’t happen, the market might organically push gold upward (a “natural revaluation”) as investors anticipate inflation or loss of confidence (vongreyerz.gold). For instance, Egon von Greyerz, a gold fund manager, argues that whether or not governments explicitly revalue, gold will “re-value itself” from the bottom up because debts keep growing and fiat currencies will be printed to cover them (vongreyerz.gold). In other words, he suggests gold’s price will go much higher in the open market as a result of current policies, even without an official peg, and effectively achieving some of the debt relief through inflation, just not as abruptly.
In weighing these perspectives, one can see a divide: those aligned with gold/hard assets see a revaluation as perhaps necessary or inevitable (though admitting it’s disruptive), while conventional policymakers view it as a dangerous last resort. Both agree on one thing: it would be a world-altering event.
Conclusion
Setting the price of gold at $140,000 per ounce, an increase of several thousand percent, would be an economic nuclear option. If a future President Trump (or any U.S. president) attempted this, it would signal that the government is choosing to drastically devalue the dollar in order to address its debt and reset the financial system. Historically, the U.S. has resorted to gold price changes only under extreme duress (the Great Depression and the breakdown of Bretton Woods), and those changes were far smaller in magnitude. A $140k gold price would eclipse those moves and fundamentally remake the global monetary order.
Political Feasibility: Under normal conditions, a U.S. president does not have free rein to dictate gold’s price as the era of an official gold peg is long past. Implementing a new gold price (especially one so high) would likely require emergency powers or new legislation, and it would face fierce opposition from the Fed, Congress, and international partners. Only in a scenario of acute crisis, for example, hyperinflation is already underway, or a debt default is imminent, could such a radical measure gain the necessary support or desperation. In essence, it’s a tool of last resort. The president alone couldn’t do it without broader government backing, and getting that backing means the situation would have to be dire.
Economic Impacts: If it were done, the immediate effect would be to inflate away U.S. debt by devaluing the currency. On paper, the national debt could be “eliminated” because the U.S. gold reserves, at the new price, would equal the debt. In reality, the debt is not truly gone, but rather it’s paid at 1 cent on the dollar (or creditors are forced to accept much less in real terms). This would amount to a de facto default, with global reverberations. U.S. bondholders, including foreign nations, would see their wealth sharply reduced. The U.S. government’s balance sheet might suddenly look healthy (no net debt), but everyone’s dollar savings and investments would lose enormous value.
Inflation domestically would be crushing in the short run. The dollar’s purchasing power would drop proportionally to the gold increase, potentially causing hyperinflationary conditions until a new equilibrium is reached. The U.S. could attempt to stabilize the dollar afterward by asserting a new gold backing at $140k, but convincing people to trust that after such a shock would be an uphill battle. It’s possible a new gold-backed dollar could emerge stronger in the long term (like a phoenix from the ashes), but only after the old dollar has been effectively destroyed by inflation. It’s not a pain-free strategy by any means, rather it basically trades a debt problem for an inflation problem.
Global Effects: Internationally, a U.S. move to revalue gold would likely force other countries to respond in kind. We could see a cascade of competitive devaluations or re-pegging to gold as nations try to protect their economies. The global monetary system would likely shift to include gold in a central role again, because once the U.S., the issuer of the leading currency, ties its hands to gold (even if under duress), others may follow to level the playing field. This could mark a return to a quasi-gold-standard globally, or at least a new system where exchange rates are realigned based on countries’ gold holdings and debt levels. The shock to trade and finance in the transition would be enormous: expect broken contracts, volatile exchange rates, bank failures in some cases, and a reordering of economic power towards those who prepared (countries with high gold reserves or low debt would fare better). In a sense, gold revaluation of that magnitude would be like hitting “reset” on the world’s financial scoreboard where gold becomes the measuring stick, and every currency’s value is adjusted accordingly.
Gold Backing and Credibility: Could the dollar return to a gold standard? Yes, if the price is high enough and the government is willing to enforce discipline. A $140,000 price suggests a desire for essentially full backing of the U.S. monetary base and debt by gold. If instituted, it would need to come with mechanisms to prevent future governments from undoing it (else it’s pointless). Credibility might require international agreements or even constitutional amendments. The U.S. would need to maintain convertibility (at least for major players) and avoid over-issuing dollars beyond what the gold peg allows. It’s a different monetary world with likely lower growth in money supply, and interest rates determined more by gold flows than central bank whims. Many economists argue this would be too rigid and could cause deflationary pressures or limit crisis response. Advocates counter that it would prevent the unchecked debt accumulation that led to the problem in the first place.
In Expert Opinion: This proposal sits at the far edge of monetary policy discussions. It straddles the line between “desperation” and “solution”, depending on whom you ask (vongreyerz.gold). As one analysis put it, it might “save the U.S. economy from crumbling” or simply mark the end of an era, with the dollar ceding its dominance (vongreyerz.gold). The consensus among most experts is that it’s not a desirable route except perhaps to avert a total collapse. It’s a scenario where politics meets physics: the political willingness to take such a step will only come when the mathematical reality of debt and inflation leaves no alternative. In plain terms, it’s unlikely, but if it ever does happen, it will be because the U.S. had no other choice.
In conclusion, a U.S. president setting gold at $140,000/oz would be undertaking a radical monetary reset with far-reaching implications. Politically, it would require either extraordinary empowerment or emergency. Economically, it equates to choosing inflation to erase debt, effectively transforming the monetary foundation of the country. Historically, it would be one of the most consequential financial decisions ever made, comparable to (but far exceeding) Roosevelt’s and Nixon’s actions. And globally, it would likely mark the end of the dollar-centric order and a return to gold (or some new neutral reserve) as the anchor of international finance. It’s a scenario that lies outside the realm of conventional policy and essentially a last resort “reset” button. Whether that button ever gets pressed will depend on how unsustainable the current path becomes and whether leaders see any other way out. Until then, the $140,000 gold ounce remains a thought experiment that illuminates the extreme ends of monetary policy, and a vivid illustration of the tension between paper promises and the tangible value of gold in times of crisis.
Sources
- Federal Reserve History – Roosevelt’s Gold Program (1933–34)
publish0x.com - Publish0x Morning JAVA – Gold Revaluation Talk, Debt vs. Gold Calculations
publish0x.com - Reuters – Trump’s Unconventional Debt Ideas and Asset Monetization (2025)
reuters.com - GoldBroker (Michael Lynch) – Analysis of Gold Price Needed to Alleviate Debt
goldbroker.com - Egon von Greyerz (Matterhorn Asset) – Gold Revaluation as Desperation Policy
vongreyerz.gold - Jerusalem Post (Andy Schectman) – Proposal of $142,000 Gold to Avert Debt Crisis
jpost.com - LinkedIn (Ron Dewitt) – Gold Standard Feasibility, Reserves vs Money Supply
linkedin.com - Discovery Alert – U.S. Gold Revaluation Rumors and Rickards Quote
discoveryalert.com.au - Wrightson ICAP via GATA – Warning on “Messy” Outcomes of Gold Revaluation
gata.org - Others as cited in text
politico.com, linkedin.com, vongreyerz.gold, etc.
